
US REVENUE CUTTERS CAPTURED IN THE WAR OF 1812

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United States Revenue Cutter Service participation in the War of 1812 has been portrayed as a series of briefly cited, romanticized, and largely incomplete recitations. In general, all previous works on this subject present a largely erroneous and imbalanced image of the service, especially of the captured cutters, that perpetuates errors and inaccuracies into future text.

Two years before Theodore Roosevelt published his book on the War of 1812, Captain (then First Lieutenant) Horatio D. Smith, USRCS, wrote articles about the USRCS for *United Service Magazine*.¹ In 1932, Rear Admiral Elliot Snow, US Navy (CC),² compiled Smith's surviving notes into a single book that became the guidon for all future study of the RCS. Smith encouraged further research into Revenue Cutter Service history "to obtain the weather gauge down to the moment of the enemy striking his colors." However, he did not expect or wish his initial work to be perpetuated deep into the next century, nor to become the final authority. He expected the future to produce a historian who would take his work and expand it. Nevertheless, successive works continue to echo Smith's brief descriptions of the actions and vessels.

The first captured in the war was the tops'le schooner revenue cutter *Commodore Barry*, the most unheralded of all the captured cutters. By chance of geography, she was the first captured,


but not necessarily the easiest. She cost more in British lives than all the other captured revenue cutters combined. Although the defense of the *Commodore Barry* ranks among the most heroic defenses of the war, it remains an elusive subject.

Captured 3 August 1812 near Eastport, Maine, the *Commodore Barry* was caught up in a British naval campaign to clean out the American privateers that British citizens complained were "swarming around our coast, and in the Bay of Fundy; hardly a day passes but hear of captures made by them."³ The British fleet struck hard at the Americans, sweeping the Maine coast in a series of easy "victories."

Two days before *Commodore Barry*'s capture, the HMS *Spartan*, and possibly HMS sloop *Indian*, sent one boat of about forty men to seize two American privateers lying in Haycock's Harbor (perhaps the current Johnson Cove) near Quoddy [Village], Maine.⁴ The privateers, *Mars* and *Morning Star*, alerted to the attack, fired into the British barges, killing or wounding an estimated twenty men.⁵ The Hallowell, Maine, *American Advocate* reported a letter from Eastport loosely describing the action. The *American Advocate* initially doubted the letter's depiction because of its vagueness, as well as the statement "allowance must be made for customary exaggeration." A Royal Marine deserter, still allowing for exaggeration, claimed that British casualties numbered thirty killed or wounded, at least partially confirming British losses. Whatever the true number, HMS *Spartan* learned a powerful lesson, then sent ten boats with an estimated two hundred men to take and burn the same privateers.

Two miles west of this battle, four and a

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QW 280 Commodore Barry. This English watercolor by Louis Bevan shows the revenue cutter *Commodore Barry* being assaulted by boats from the *Maidstone*. It appears that Bevan mistakenly painted the cutter as a sloop rig. The cutter was actually drawn up on shore, and it is doubtful if the crewmen remaining on board put up any resistance to the British boarding party. Illustrations courtesy of The Mariners' Museum, Newport News, Virginia.

half miles from Eastport, the *Commodore Barry*, Captain Daniel Elliot,⁶ and the Gloucester privateer *Madison*, Captain Elwell, as well as the privateers *Olive* and *Spruce* lay at anchor in the Little River. Both captains received news of captures. Having no escape route, they hauled their respective vessels on shore (or into the shallows), removed what guns they could, and hastily built a "battery of cord wood" on shore.⁷

The British attacked the three privateers, the revenue cutter, and the temporary fort with five barges containing about 250 men from HMS *Indian*, *Plumper*, *Spartan*, and *Maidstone*.⁸ The local community heard heavy gunfire for about two hours before the British overwhelmed the Americans, who had probably run short of ammunition. Although unlisted, British casualties occurred. The Americans

"took to the woods" to avoid capture; however, not all of the *Commodore Barry's* men escaped. Presumably remaining on board *Commodore Barry* were seamen Daniel Marshall, Charles Woodward, and William Babson. They remained prisoners until paroled in June 1813. During September 1812, Marshall and Woodward served as part of the crew "to navigate" the captured schooner *Fortune*.⁹

Following the American's flight, Captain Jaheel Brenton of the *Spartan* sent "a detachment of 10 Marines" to secure the cutter. He returned, bringing out the "Commodore Berry Revenue Cutter of 6 Guns,"¹⁰ although pierced for ten guns. There was no mention of capturing any of the guns taken ashore. In all, it was a busy summer for the British fleet. From 18 June to 14 August 1812, it captured the United States brig *Nautilus*, thirteen privateers, one Revenue

cutter, fifteen ships, four brigs, ten schooners, and one sloop.

Although the details of her capture are virtually unnoticed in contemporary Coast Guard histories, the *Commodore Barry* has caused some confusion in previous accounts. Howard I. Chapelle, in *The History of American Sailing Ships*, incorrectly refers to the cutter as the *Commodore Hull* and *Commodore Barney* as well as giving a capture date of 3 August 1813. The Treasury Department purchased *Commodore Barry* at New York in March or April 1812, more than eight months before the US schooner *Commodore Hull* was placed in commission.¹¹ The schooner *Commodore Barney* was a privateer from Baltimore.¹² Chapelle also mistakenly claims that, on 16 January 1813, the American privateer *Anaconda* accidentally fired on the *Commodore Barry* — some five months after the British captured her. Similarly in 1989, Coast Guard Academy history professor Irving H. King refers to the cutter as the *Commodore Hull*, and repeats the January 1813 incident. He cites the capture date as August 1814, a full two years later. H. D. Smith makes no mention of the *Commodore Barry*'s capture in his original work, other than to say that it existed on the list of cutters in service.

There are also conflicting accounts of the cutter's disposition. Some claim she was used as a tender by the British, while others claim she was dismantled at St. John, New Brunswick. The latter appears to be correct. Captain Pierce, of the captured privateer *Sally*, spent seven days at St. John, where he saw "3 small privateers and the revenue cutter Com Barry, Elliot, hauled up and stripped." The St. John press also noted: "The Indian and Plumper have sent in three prizes among them is a U. S. Revenue Cutter and two privateers." Although she had a short and unnoticed career, the heroic defense of the *Commodore Barry* is one of the finest in the service's history.

The schooner *James Madison* was the next revenue cutter captured. Although claimed to be the most successful revenue cutter of the war,

there has been no in-depth research into these claims, nor into the circumstances surrounding her capture and disposition. All published accounts credit *James Madison* with three victories. In interpreting H. D. Smith's notes in 1932, Rear Admiral Elliot Snow, USN (CC), appears to have confused *James Madison*'s 1812 capture of the *Snow* rather than seizing a snow.¹³ Perhaps a coincidence of spelling caused an unintentional clouding of Snow's editorial processes — or Smith's notes created the error. In his nineteenth century article on this subject, he wrote "The 'Madison' [revenue cutter] (a snow) sent into Savannah, mounting 6 guns, loaded with ammunition, also the brig 'Shamrock,' of 300 tons, 6 guns and 16 men." Nearly every author of Coast Guard history to the present makes this same misinterpretation.

Smith's sentence could be interpreted three ways, but in reality there was only one capture. The snow and the brig *Shamrock* are the same vessel. Captain George Brooks of the *Madison* reported the capture of the Brig *Shamrock* that "mounts Six 6 & 9 Pounders,"¹⁴ which mirrors the 25 July 1812 report in the *Savannah Republican and Savannah Evening Ledger* describing the vessel as a snow. United States Marshal prisoner-of-war records at Savannah list the vessel as the *Snow Shamrock*, with a capture date of 23 July 1812. The responsibility for the confusion rests in competing versions of two Savannah newspapers. *Republican and Savannah Evening Ledger* reported a snow was brought into Savannah on 24 July. That same day, the *Savannah Museum* listed the vessel as "the British brig *Shamrock*" captured after an eight-hour chase between Tybee and Cumberland Islands.

Official American records of British prisoners add to the misunderstanding by citing Francis Kellog as *Shamrock*'s master when both the *Savannah Museum* and Brooks' report lists a Captain May as her master.¹⁵ Conceivably, Kellog was the sailing master or first officer. The US Marshal at Savannah sent Kellog and nine others to Nassau on the cartel sloop *Delight* on 1 November 1812. The only other prize

claimed by the *James Madison* was the schooner *Wade* from New Providence, which fell, accidentally, to the cutter at Amelia Island, Georgia.

This naval war was more than tactics and strategy or national pride. It was about profits; it could be, and was, very profitable for some. This motive certainly drove the privateers and probably caused the ultimate defeat of Captain Brooks and the loss of the *James Madison*. Brooks put the cutter's loss in motion as early as 13 July 1812, when he notified Archibald S. Bulloch, Collector of Customs at Savannah, Georgia, of the near impossibility of finding small arms sufficient to arm his expanded crew.¹⁶ Brooks probably expanded his crew at Charleston, one that would ultimately consist of sixty-five seamen, four officers, and a surgeon. He also needed increased numbers of arms, but found the growing number of privateers had depleted Charleston of the ready arms market. He informed Bulloch he had to "employ [a] Blacksmith to make Cutlasses."

Brooks then solicited Simeon Theus, the Customs Collector at Charleston, to purchase pistols but the collector refused because the cutter was not his responsibility. In desperation, he turned to a local factor who loaned him an unspecified amount to buy the arms. This was a highly unorthodox method for Brooks to arm his crew unless he made arrangements to repay the loan from his next cruise. That probably did not include protecting the revenue.

In the 13 July letter to Bulloch, Brooks reminded him, "the old saying is there is no loss without someone all gain," and alluded to potential profit, "I have information of six merchantmen unprotected with full cargoes [and I] shall be after them tomorrow morning." Brooks received his information from arriving merchant vessels and the Charleston newspaper *The Times*, which proclaimed "Privateer look out !!!" announcing that 150 merchant vessels under convoy departed Tortola on 27 June.¹⁷ Brooks planned a cutting out expedition, but no records have been uncovered to indicate whether or not he made the attempt. In mid-July, in

a brief encounter, he chased the armed British ship *Rising Empire* off the Savannah bar, but failed to make the capture. The only other encounter before his last cruise was on August 1 when the *James Madison* escorted the Spanish brig *Santa Anna* to Savannah for adjudication.

Sailing from Savannah on 15 August 1812 in company with the privateers *Paul Jones*, *Hazard*, and the *Spencer*, Morse Brooks began his last cruise. While he cruised south and eastward, well out of his authorized cruising grounds, HMS *Barbadoes* and HMS *Polyphemous* escorted "47 Sail of Convoy" of the Jamaican July Convoy.

On 20 August, Captain Peter John Douglas, commanding *Polyphemous*, logged, "At 4 [P.M.] Saw a strange sail on the Lee quarter. *Barbadoes* in chase." The *Barbadoes* successfully chased the *James Madison* from the convoy, but Brooks, determined to cut out at least one, stayed on the convoy's skirts, waiting for an opportunity to strike. On 22 August, Douglas matter-of-factly noted in his log:

at day light Saw a strange Schooner in the fleet.
at 8 *Barbadoes* in chase
at noon hove to the *Barbadoes* in company with chase
3.30 joined company [with] the *Barbadoes* with American Schooner *James Madison Prize*.
at 6 received on Board 50 prisoners from the *Barbadoes*.¹⁸

The next day, Douglas detailed a lieutenant (one of eight on board), a midshipman, and twenty men from *Polyphemus*, in addition to about fifteen of the *James Madison*'s men, to fit her out for convoy protection and sail her as a prize to England.

Captain Thomas Huskisson of the *Barbadoes* reported his part in the capture.¹⁹ In "Latitude 31°N Longitude 75°W," he chased *James Madison* for seven hours before capturing her. All contemporary sources record the capture was near Savannah. None report just how near, although the actual distance was about "250

miles southward and eastward of Savannah.”²⁰ *Polyphemus*’ log indicates the chase lasted only four hours but Huskisson may have begun his chase at first light. He described the schooner pierced for fourteen guns but carried only ten, “armed with 6 guns of 6 lbs. 4 carronades of 12 lbs” and “two [6 pounders] of which were thrown overboard in the chase.” Impressed with the cutter, he noted, “She is coppered and copper fastened is two years old and sails remarkably fast.”

This official account stands in sharp contrast to that printed in the Boston press a month later. Captain Morgan, a parolee on board the Salem cartel schooner *Hero*, arrived at New York on 10 September 1812. He related a version of the capture from *James Madison*’s surgeon, John Gre[e]ndree, also a parolee on board *Hero*.²¹ No explanation was given why the surgeon did not give the story directly to the press, nor why, later, none of the *James Madison*’s officers published their personal accounts.

Morgan repeated that the *James Madison* carried ten guns and seventy-five men on the night before, and that the capture ran into the convoy and cut out two vessels that Brooks ordered to the United States. The following night, the cutter again attacked the convoy and mistook the *Barbadoes* for a large merchantman. Brooks fired several guns and attempted to board the 260-man, 38-gun frigate before discovering his mistake.


The disparities in the versions are evident, but the accounts of Captains Douglas and Huskisson have more credibility on several points. None of the “captures” claimed in Morgan’s account have been located in adjudication records, confirming Huskisson’s report that the cutter “has made no captures.” In addition, logs indicate the cutter got no closer than the “skirts of the convoy.” All factors seem to indicate the capture was more than the revenue cutter merely bumping into the frigate in the night.

Huskisson’s notation that the revenue cutter was but two years old contrasts with other

references that offer an 1807–1808 construction period. He may have misunderstood the actual cutter’s age. He had none of the cutter’s officers on board to interrogate and most likely questioned the crew, nearly all of whom were new to the revenue cutter. The *James Madison* had received extensive repairs in 1811. On 9 January 1811, the Collector at New York, David Gelston, wrote Bulloch that Captain Worthington Gale (then the commander) received \$10,647.34 for repairs. The extensive repairs could be considered a rebuilding, making the cutter essentially new. It was also common to place a revenue schooner in a shipyard and rebuild it when appropriations were not available for a new one. However, the repairs appear not extensive enough. A Royal Navy survey held at the Portsmouth Navy Yard on 17 April 1813 shows the schooner a “slight vessel, the fore part of the keelson and some of the timbers in a state of decay,” and not recommended for purchase into the Royal Navy.

On 13 June 1813, the Second Earl of Belmore, Enniskillen, Ireland [Northern] purchased this “slight vessel” for privateer work. He had her rerigged as a brig and installed fourteen carronades. The bill of sale shows the schooner, renamed *Osprey*, to be “burthen 172 tons & 79/94... foreign built, 1 deck, 2 masts, length from forepart of stem to after part of the taffrail aloft is 86’ 3”, Breath 22’ 10” half her height in the hold 7’ 11”... square sterned schooner, no galle[r]y, no head.”²² Following the war, *Osprey* became Lord Belmore’s private yacht. She was used on a two-year trip to the Mediterranean, and ultimately sold to the King of Naples in 1819.

Of all the elements of the story, the cutter’s crew size is the most interesting. With a complement of sixty-five seamen and boys, she was about three times larger than the size authorized by the Treasury Department for any revenue vessel. The frugality of the Treasury Department allowed only just enough men on board cutters to work them. The only exception was in the hiring of boys. A captain was allowed to hire two boys in the place of one able seaman.



James Madison, by renown marine artist C. J. A. Wilson. Incorrectly titled *James Madison*, 1813. Scanned copy from 1858 US Coast Guard pamphlet *Coast Guard History*. (CG-213), USCG Public Information Office, GPO, Washington.

Average crew size for a revenue cutter of this era numbered twenty-five men and boys, or less. The *James Madison's* enlarged crew size and location at time of capture lends credibility to a hypothesis that Brooks turned the cutter from revenue to privateer work. The question remains as to just who authorized this greatly expanded crew and its changed mission. Perhaps no one but Brooks and Bulloch. The presence of Bulloch family members' names found in the *James Madison's* crew lead to this conclusion. It was not uncommon for members

of the customs collector's family, as well as the cutter's officers, to find employment on the local revenue cutter.

However expanded or for what purpose, details of the disposition of the crew were largely unknown. This is surprising, considering this was the largest capture of men from a revenue or a Coast Guard cutter in American history. Following capture, the cutter's officers remained on *Barbadoes*. Fortunately for them, a hurricane badly damaged the *Barbadoes* frigate and dispersed the convoy. With a broken mainmast, she put into Bermuda for repairs and for regrouping the convoy's stragglers. The storm also saved the American officers from a continued voyage to England and imprisonment.

In all previous writings, George Brooks, the captain, was the only known officer on board. However, prisoner records reveal the remain-

ing officers as First Lieutenant John Emerus, Second Lieutenant Richard Cole, and Third Lieutenant William Lucas who, with two unidentified crewmen, left Bermuda on board the cartel brig *Diamond* for the eighteen-day voyage to New York.²³

The majority of the crew were not so fortunate. Nine seamen, sent on board HMS *Shannon*, landed at Melville Island. They were exchanged at New York in November; four others "navigated" the *Aneline* to Boston.²⁴ On 4 October 1812, forty others landed at Ports-

mouth, England, and were sent to prison at Chatham. Among this group was the service's youngest prisoner of war, Beloner Pault, a fifteen-year-old from Savannah.²⁵ They remained in prison at Chatham or in other prisons until their releases between February and June 1813. One seaman, John Bearbere, died of pneumonia on 28 May 1813, and three others joined the East India Company.

Ironically, only one man petitioned for a pension for service aboard the revenue cutter. Seaman William Palms requested a pension for his service in 1840, but the Treasury Department rejected it claiming it had no record of him ever serving on the *James Madison*. This may be true. Brooks probably never informed the Treasury Department of his expanded crew. Treasury regulations required a listing of all on board at the end of the each month. In addition, a series of fires at the Treasury following the war may have destroyed the records.

There were four others neither imprisoned nor released, four unidentified black seamen in the cutter's crew who the British claimed were slaves. Treasury Department regulations forbade, although the cutter did not appear to be following regulations, the hiring of blacks. If Brooks was filling out a privateer crew, he took what men he could find, and if the experienced seamen happened to be black, it was of no concern to him. Whatever on-board positions these men filled, this documents one of the earliest uses of free black men on board a US revenue cutter, dispelling a popular theory that blacks could serve only in positions of personal servitude on board revenue cutters.

Following the capture, the British separated the supposed slaves and sent them on board HMS *Shannon*, where the British commander "emancipated" them — but not immediately. The "slaves" spent time in the British prison ship *Centurion* at Halifax until transferred to HMS *Tartarus*, presumably working as seamen, and supposedly were set free at Barbados on 27 March 1813. Three other seamen classified as "Mulatto," who were considered freemen, Beloner Pault and Zephir Gasseyr of Savannah,

and Oliver Gale from New York, remained at Chatham Prison until they were exchanged in February 1813. The capture of the supposed slaves from the revenue cutter set a precedent for the remainder of the war.

In 1816, the British asked for the release of the twenty-two slave crewmen captured during 1813–1814 from the British privateers *Caledonia* and *Dash*, schooners *Hassar* and *Fame*, and brig *President*, held at Savannah. The United States released the British slaves to the British Vice-Consul at Savannah in June 1816, but the dispute over a bounty for them lasted into 1818. The capturers claimed the property value of the slaves as prize money, and from there the dispute arose why they had been held so long after the war. All free men of color were repatriated at the close of the war. However, the issue about slaves was not clear. The US government used the supposed slaves captured from the *James Madison* as the criterion. The British would not consider them prisoners of war but, according to General John Mason, kept them for work on board British vessels or transports to British territories. Ultimately, those claiming prize money for the slaves received a \$100 bounty for each slave. The supposed slaves from *James Madison* were never repatriated, and no official accounting made of their whereabouts. They remain among the nation's longest held prisoners of war.

Understandably, these views of the *James Madison*'s actions and loss are less heroic than depicted in previous accounts. Captain Brooks' cupidious personality probably drove him to overman and set his command well out of its authorized cruising grounds, placing both cutter and crew in greater jeopardy. Had he succeeded in his exploits he would have graced the era's popular press and Coast Guard history. Instead, he and the *James Madison* drifted into obscurity.

Obscurity will not be a problem for the tale of the capture of the revenue cutter *Surveyor*. The 12 June 1813 defense and ultimate capture of the *Surveyor* ranks second in popular romantic RCS history only to the later capture of the

revenue cutter *Eagle*. Heroism permeates the writings on this short action, but unfortunately, sentimentality has clouded objective inquiry. H. D. Smith, especially enamored with the heroics, wrote an 1892 article in which he provided verbatim dialogue between the cutter's officers as well as numerous other undocumented details. Oddly, this unindexed article escaped modern bibliographies and overlooked by contemporary researchers. Most modern authors find it sufficient to make Captain Samuel Travis the hero of the day and leave the remainder to anonymity. However, the post-action difficulties experienced by the officers and men provide a larger understanding of the Treasury Department's outlook toward its Revenue Cutter Service personnel than previously known.

Surveyor's officers and men indeed heroically defended their vessel. The return of Captain Samuel Travis' sword by the British was the historical high point of the incident, but far too much has been made of what was not an unusual event. Captain Broke of HMS *Shannon* returned the sword of Captain Crane of the US Brig *Nautilus* "in consequence of his good conduct in endeavoring to save his vessel." The British respected, and expected, officers in the heroic efforts; however, the losing crew and junior officers usually suffered for presenting the same stubbornness. Unfortunately, in part because of Travis' perceived heroism, the details of remaining *Surveyor* crewmen and officers are forgotten.


The action began on 13 June 1813, literally a rainy and foggy night. The cutter lay anchored off Point Fort on the Gloucester side in the York River, having moved there from Queen's Creek to get out of the range of the British cannons at York. The British remarked her position and continued to fire artillery pieces at her from the Gloucester shore.

Captured that evening by four barges from the HMS *Narcissus*, the brevity of this battle should have produced a fairly consistent historical representation. Nonetheless, numerous inconsistencies may be found in descriptions of some authors. Naval history enthusiast John H.

Robertson provides the most complete analysis of the *Surveyor* capture.²⁶ He points out that many contemporary authors continue to draw on Elliot Snow's editing and Smith's account rather than visiting the growing availability of primary sources.

The major differences are the cutter's physical description, number of guns, and how attacked, with each author basing his description on a predecessor's work. Smith began, because he was unsure, with a generic vessel of 125 tons with six to ten light guns; Chapelle listed six 12-pounders; Irving King appears to have confused the 1807 *Virginia* with the *Surveyor*, and the *Surveyor* with the *James Madison*, but follows Chapelle's lead with the same number and type of cannon. Russell R. Waesche added to the fray in 1929, stating the *Surveyor's* eight guns were 12-pound carronades and presumed, "this was typical armament for cutters of that class." William James, stating the captured revenue cutters were of "little value," gave six guns and 100 tons. Smith later expanded, in another article, on his description of the cutter to that of a "small, well-modeled craft, with low bulwarks and square stern, topsail schooner rigged, mounting six 12-pounder iron carronades."²⁷ The cutter in truth was probably nearer 75 tons and carried only six small guns.

Baltimore Customs Collector James McCulloch wrote on 19 June 1813 that the cutter was "an old vessel, scarcely worth repairing. Carried six guns of small caliber."²⁸ Four of these guns were probably the same ones the navy agent at Baltimore asked to be returned in 1810. The navy agent loaned four six-pounders to *Surveyor*, which promoted McCulloch to write to Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin asking to keep the Navy's guns.²⁹ They probably remained on board. Just sixty days prior to the capture, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Parker, Westmoreland County Militia, Virginia, reported to Governor James Barbour that the cutter had been "cooperating" with the militia and carried four iron six-pounders and two brass four-pounders.³⁰ The Treasury Depart-



QW 328 Surveyor. Another watercolor by Louis Bevan depicts the assault in a manner which did not occur. Cutting out expeditions were usually coordinated to prevent one boat from taking the brunt of the resistance. In addition, Bevan was unaware that revenue cutters did not fly the national ensign, but the vertically striped revenue ensign, until 1896. The schooner should also be pointing up river and be closer to the northern (left) bank. Illustrations courtesy of The Mariners' Museum, Newport News, Virginia.

ment's renowned stinginess would not allow expenditures to update or improve this, or any other, cutter's armaments.

Contradictions about the fight for the cutter are as numerous as those of the guns, including the number of British barges attacking the cutter. Captain J. R. Lumley, commanding HMS *Narcissus*, clearly reported sending "four of the Boats" to take the "Enemys Armed Schooner laying in York River." Drawing on Snow's edited version, King and Bell note two barges, Evans does not give an exact number, and Chapelle records three barges in total.³¹ In his 1892 article, Smith wrote, "three dark, indistinct masses suddenly loomed up through the fog... one large, double-banked barge was seen to diverge from its course." He probably based his conclusion, in part, on a 14 June letter

written by Third Lieutenant William L. Travis, explaining his part and period press accounts.³² Professor John Tilley, writing for the US Coast Guard's Historical Painting Project, follows King and Bell in depicting the scene.³³

Primary and secondary references indicate that the British barges were too close for the cutter to bring its cannon to bear. This sounds reasonable, if the boats made a surprise attack. All references demonstrate that Captain Travis anticipated the attack and reported seeing the barges at about one hundred fifty yards range, well within effective cannon range. The accounts indicate he had the guns run out and loaded. The cutter's cannon were just a few feet above the water. The line of fire, even with solid shot, would have been an acceptable action if for nothing else than to terrorize the

attackers. Smith wrote that during the attack a crewman accidentally fired one gun "in the excitement of the attack... its contents passing harmlessly overhead." Apparently Travis and the crew expected to use their cannon. They had linstock lit and cannon primed.

Tilley adds a possible explanation as to why the cutter's cannon were not used. First Lieutenant John Crie, ³² commanding the British expedition, probably split up his boat force and attacked from forward and astern. This was a common tactic to prevent the use of the great guns. Captain Lumley reported the cutter's crew "were fully prepared for the attack, having all their small Arms loaded and laying by them on deck waiting until our boats got alongside when they fired directly into them." Lumley's "alongside" remark may not be literal. Smith's 1892 narrative indicates Travis, in standard battle preparation, had the "boarding-netting triced up." An illustration of this type of attack is the capture of the slaver *Borboleta* by HM Brig *Pantaloön* in 1845 off Lagos, West Africa. This painting shows attacking boats staggered to split the usually smaller defending crew, forcing the *Borboleta* to repel boarders at different locations. Similarly, the British barges probably attacked *Surveyor* from both sides, which would account for the few casualties.

Although the small arms' fire from the cutter was terrific, probably about eighty rounds, the British quickly gained the deck. Captured first were Second Lieutenant Phippen and five men protecting the forward section. Within ten minutes, the attackers beat Captain Travis, his executive officer First Lieutenant John Hebb, and the remainder of the crew onto the quarterdeck. Reportedly Travis, armed with a musket and two pistols, killed a British seaman and Captain Thomas Ford of the Royal Marine. Although it was a brief fight, the casualties for the seventy-seven British attackers were three killed and six wounded, three seriously. The revenue cutter suffered but six wounded crewman, one seriously.

As the battle ended, so did historical in-

quiry. As with *James Madison*, authors have ignored the disposition of *Surveyor's* crew. Nearly all previous references cite sixteen captured officers and men, but they were estimates. Collector McCulloch reported sixteen men and three officers captured, lifting the total to nineteen. He also expanded the total number of personnel attached to the revenue cutter. Apart from the nineteen on board, five men and Third Lieutenant William L. Travis escaped in the guard boat and four others were ashore.

The British put the *Surveyor's* officers, except for Captain Travis, and men on board the *Junon* for eventual transfer to prison. Travis remained on board *Junon* until early August, when he was paroled at Washington, North Carolina. Some of the officers and men went to confinement at Halifax or England [Chatham or Dartmoor], while others were released.

The British released or paroled the Americans among the *Surveyor's* force over the next year. On 17 December 1813, First Lieutenant Hebb was exchanged by way of *Annabaston* cartel. Seaman Peter Williams was exchanged on 2 February 1814 on board the cartel vessel *Boslock*. On 14 July 1813, Seaman (listed as Master) John Allman and his son, John Allman, Jr., arrived home on board the *Agnes* cartel. One other seaman, Antonio May, is listed with no notation. Second Lieutenant William Phippen [Pippen], listed as William Pepper, and seamen John McCarty (perhaps McCarlie), James Hall, James Marmer (aka Alarmon or Marmion), and John Lynch were sent to Boston from Halifax by the *Mary* cartel on 23 July 1814.

Seven other seamen were not so fortunate. On 19 January 1814, seaman John Bowden, aged seventeen, George Randolph, Nicholas Pimkins (or Pikins, Perkins), Andrew Peterson, William Prices (alias Penitfor Pruitt), Zachary Cole and Samuel Berry, all were found to be British subjects, despite listing American places of birth, and sent on board *Malabar* to an English prison.

Ironically, had the attack occurred ten days later there would have been no revenue cutter to

seize. On 21 June 1813, R. C. Jones, Acting Treasury Secretary, wrote James McCulloch that "during the continuance of the present state of things," the cutter "can be of no use" because of the British blockade and control of the Chesapeake Bay. Jones told McCulloch to inform the officers and crew "they are to consider themselves as being no longer in the service of the United States." This notification set an adverse stage for the *Surveyor's* officers and crew alike.

Released from Halifax, Lieutenant Phippen arrived at Boston about 5 August, with the four seamen, and asked for transportation funds to Baltimore. Boston Collector Henry Dearborn, using the authority of General James Mason's prisoner of war department, advanced Phippen two hundred dollars from the "Marine Hospital" accounts, assuming Baltimore Collector McCulloch would reimburse him. McCulloch responded to Dearborn's request on 12 August, claiming, "It is not in my power to send at present the amount of the Bill, so much not being due to Mr. Peppins."

McCulloch claimed he paid all the wages due Phippen and the others to Captain Travis, presumably at their requests, for transfer to their families. According to McCulloch, these men received their full pay because of "a decision at the Treasury, their right to Wages exists only to that time [of capture], or the time at which they *are informed* of their discharge" (author emphasis).

In other words, the 21 June 1813 letter informing McCulloch to lay off the *Surveyor's* crew stood as notification, although they were already prisoners. He also acknowledged a technical point that none of the captured men received "their being out of service" notice and asked that the officers be allowed to retain a pay status until they were released from prison. Continuing in his letter to Dearborn, "We shall try to get an allowance for the Officers on this principle, but the rule seems absolute to the Men."

Dearborn, not pleased with McCulloch's answer or lack of reimbursement, retorted, "I

did expect it would have been fully paid by you, as the Money was advanced to the officer on the belief that you would pay the sum back at sight [presentation of draft]." Dearborn claimed he advanced Phippen the amount "as an act of courtesy toward you, as I was under no obligations to afford relief to the officers & Men," and asked for repayment to him and to "settle the same with the Treasury."

Three days later, McCulloch had his deputy, John Brice, write Travis at Williamsburg, Virginia, and ask him to have the \$21.50 advanced to each of the four seamen at Boston collected from the men's families and returned to the collector's office. By 15 December, Brice informed Dearborn that McCulloch, recovering from wounds received in the British attack on Baltimore, heard nothing from Captain Travis, and recommended the amount be charged to the hospital accounts. The payment issue had now gone full circle. No records have surfaced to indicate whether or not Dearborn ever received reimbursement. In all likelihood, he did not. This was not McCulloch's first incident with pay problems for the *Surveyor's* officers and men.

During May 1814, both Captain Travis and First Lieutenant Hebb visited Baltimore to settle accounts. McCulloch, unsure how to handle the situation, asked for direction from Treasury Secretary George W. Campbell. Campbell, interim treasury secretary from February to October 1814, did not know the case's history and gave McCulloch an ambiguous response. Campbell told him to follow the rule of the 21 June 1813 letter dismissing the officers and crew, but altered his stand toward the seamen. He would be satisfied if McCulloch paid them "by such equitable rule as after inquiry made [by] you shall find to have been adopted in similar cases."³⁵

This was no answer, but McCulloch, Captain Travis, and John Hebb attempted to locate parallel cases. They found it customary for the Navy to continue the pay the officers and men until they personally reported their return. There was a catch. The officers and men had to

report immediately upon their return. If they delayed, such as visiting their families first or through personal neglect, the government was under no obligation to pay them.

McCulloch recommended this treatment for the officers and men of the *Surveyor*. In theory, while on parole they remained technically prisoners, and thereby were entitled to continued pay. However, the treasury department's opinion differed. Once the officers and men were released and paid off, they were no longer entitled to continued pay. Countering, the officers claimed a different status from their men.

They claimed their commissions entitled them to full pay and allowances until the President dismissed them. He referred to the revenue cutter *Jefferson* at Norfolk, Captain Ham, which was laid up about February 1813. Her crew was dismissed, but her officers remained in the service at full pay. Captain Travis thought this treatment unfair, considering his command fought the enemy and spent time as prisoners. Touting his ten years as a revenue officer, he rebutted such treatment as unconscionable. He claimed he and his officers worked solely at the pleasure of the President and could not be dismissed on the word of a collector of customs.

Travis had a personal reason for wanting the President, rather than the collector, to dismiss him and his officers. He worried about the public perception of their personal characters. He worried that dismissal by the collector would "bring the public to conclude unfavorably respecting them, and adding loss of character to other hardship." He had good reason to feel this way. Apart from his years of revenue service, his father-in-law was Captain Francis Bright, USRCS, who was the past commander of the revenue cutters *Surveyor* and *Jefferson*, and was an influential person in the Virginia tide water area.³⁶

The treasury secretary did not agree. On 25 June 1814, he wrote that they were "officers of the Customs and as such, are removable from office at any time without trial and without

receiving anymore pay than was due." This attitude and procedure of the treasury department remained in effect for the next century. Captain Travis and officers lost their attempt to remain in the service, yet all, including the men, received or were allowed to keep the wages due them for their respective periods of captivity. However, none received pensions under the 18 April 1814 law, yet allowing those injured while serving with the Navy to receive it. Their service was, technically, not with the US Navy and occurred before the law went into effect.

The fight was not yet over. In 1816, Travis, now the Representative of Williamsburg in the Virginia House of Burgesses, filed a petition with the Naval Committee in the US House of Representatives. It was an impassioned appeal:

Your petitioners cannot bring to their aid much logic but they feel if the government select the moment of imprisonment to abandon those in their service that their conduct be deplorable indeed.

Travis took his case to Virginia Representative Burwick Bassett who, in turn, queried Treasury Secretary A. J. Dallas. Dallas sidestepped the issue, stating that he could not second guess the decisions of his predecessor and relied on the written record. Collector McCulloch continued to claim that the officers and men were informed they were no longer in service and were not entitled to any more pay and allowances. The point was fairness. McCulloch claimed, but could not prove, that Travis was informed that he was out of service because he never acknowledged McCulloch's original letter. In March 1816, the Naval Committee agreed with Travis. They allowed the claim of the officers to the time of their release and of the crew when they were released. It was a victory, but it took Travis' political influence to gain what was honorably due them.

Like an unexploded shell, the 21 June 1813 letter lingered in the Treasury Department files. In March 1840, Hopewell Hebb, the widow of John Hebb, applied for a pension based on her husband's service in the war. The Treasury

Department used the letter against Hebb's widow, noting her husband was notified he was no longer in service, ignoring the decision of the 1816 Naval Committee. This link to war service with the Navy and pensions remained for the Revenue Cutter Service and US Coast Guard until after World War I.

The primary sources provide a more realistic view of the *Surveyor*, its capture, and the postwar treatment of its crew than has been given by all previous written historical accounts. John Tilley provides an excellent description about the *Surveyor*'s action that seems to have been the formula for the majority of research of revenue cutters during the War of 1812. He advised there was enough information to "create a generic revenue cutter deck scene — if it's cluttered up with lots of people and a fair amount of smoke" then essentially no one will know the difference. Seemingly some authors took this advice and cluttered the historical decks with overused material without consulting the original sources.

The events around the most famous capture are as equally cluttered. The revenue cutter *Eagle* receives the most attention in Coast Guard history. It was a notable defense, but the gratuitous attention given her probably has more to do with geography than deed. The eastern seaboard, from Boston to Baltimore, is the heartland of the US Coast Guard. Following the Civil War, over seventy-five percent of the service's officers were from the northeast. With them came this region's perception of history and service.

The Connecticut home port of the revenue cutter *Eagle* (no. 2) was in close proximity to the current location of the US Coast Guard Academy, giving the 1814 *Eagle* a local recognition advantage in current history over all other captured cutters. The current training sailing barque is also named *Eagle*.

Because of the attention given her, the *Eagle*'s tale remains fairly consistent in published works. However, the connection that the same British commander who orchestrated *Eagle*'s capture took the *Surveyor* the year

before has been overlooked. Captain J. R. Lumley, HMS *Narcissus*, gave his account of the *Eagle* to the *London Gazette*, Lumley reported "off Negro Head, the 13th of October... the boats of the *Narcissus* and *Dispatch*, under Lieutenant Scott, of the former, brought out under fire of a battery, and a number of militia, the American revenue Schooner *Eagle*, pierced for ten guns, but only two mounted."³⁷

Lumley's description illustrates some differences from other published works in date of capture and armaments. H. D. Smith records 17 October, the date of press notification, Evans indicates only "late in the month of October," Melvin H. Jackson, claims 11 October, and Chappelle and King settle for a generic "in October 1814."³⁸ A letter in the October 14 issue of the *New York Evening Post*, which Jackson called "uncorroborated," appears to confirm Lumley's report. Although seemingly an unimportant detail, the exact date will give the base data to calculate the rise and fall of the tide at Long Island.

Smith's account indicates that the *Eagle*'s captain tried to enter "the creek [Wading River], there not being sufficient depth of water." Evidently, Captain Frederick Lee's first — and prudent — reaction after encountering the main British force was to run. He counted on the safety of Wading Creek, which may have prevented his capture.

The number of cannon cited by every modern account has been six. However, Lumley made it clear that although pierced for ten only two remained on board. Chappelle is silent on this issue, but Jackson, who quotes the cutter "pierced for six guns" along with Smith, Bell, and King, claims two 2-pounders and two 4-pounders. Evans and the US Coast Guard's *Record of Movements* indicate two 2-pounders and four 4-pounders.³⁹ This may be one of those historical occurrences when all are correct despite the differences in numbers.

When Lee departed New Haven, he asked for assistance from the local militia company. Captain John Davis, the militia company commander, probably knew the cutter's deficiency of cannon and took along two of his company's as supplements. Davis added about thirty men



The Defense of the Eagle, from a mural at the US Coast Guard Academy. This is a highly romanticized view of the action. It is doubtful that the crewmen wore these uniforms; the service had no stated uniforms for the cuttermen. This scene shows no member of the militia who assisted in the action. USCG photo.

from his company to the cutter's force of twenty-three. If Captain Lee decided to leave two cannon on board, it would have been an understandable decision. The six-foot-long 4-pounder, without carriage, powder, shot, and equipment, weighed approximately 1,200 pounds. This material, in addition to food, water, and any other equipment was heavy. His crew and the militia volunteers manhandled the guns up the approximate 200-foot bluff to the safety of "Negro Head" [Friar's Head]. Both Smith and Jackson noted Lee probably had assistance from local villagers. King, following Smith, answered the discrepancy in the actual number of guns. He noted the cutter crew and militia "manhandled" two 2-pounders and two of the 4-pounders up the bluff.

Ammunition was probably another reason to leave the guns behind. Throughout the war, the Treasury Department did not consider

prosecution of the war its responsibility unless it effected collection of the revenue. It did not make expenditures for non-Treasury related items such as extra gunpowder, and the US Navy would not supply vessels it did not control. Lee probably kept just enough ammunition on board to satisfy the minimum needs, whatever they may be. Records do show that between January and October 1814, the *Eagle* received one full cask and seven quarter casks of powder amounting to about 150 pounds. Evidently, the cutter had little powder on board. Her inventory on return to New Haven on board the Sloop *Lutor* listed none. The inventory of items returned also indicated twenty-three muskets, seventeen bayonets, thirteen pistols, nineteen cartridge boxes (of twenty-four cartridges each), four powder horns, "Two — 4.lb. Cannon, Two — 2.lb. —do [ditto]." Presumably the two 2-pounders belonged to the militia. The

other material returned, direfully termed "the remains of Cutter Eagle," were "All the sails. — most of the rigging, blocks.... Spars—all but masts," which implies Captain Lee had ample time to strip the cutter and save both his long-boat and yawl. This stripping may also account for the destroyed look mentioned by the British from offshore.

Out of ammunition and unable to assist any further, the militia company packed up their kits and made their way back to New London. Evidently, Lee knew that the *Eagle* was lost before the battle began. He was out-gunned by the firepower of the brig [cruiser] *Dispatch* [*Despatch*], mounting sixteen 32-pounders and two 6-pounders and the frigate *Narcissus*, mounting twenty-six 18-pounders, four 6-pounders, six or eight 24-pounders, and two 6-pounders, by more than ten to one.

Lee made a prudent decision that saved his crew from death, injury, and capture, but the excessive attention to heroism appears misplaced. Once ashore, the cutter crew's safety was assured. The topography and sound British tactical reasoning made the prize, that was eventually secured, not worth putting men in danger. In comparison, the defense of the *Eagle* pales next to the other cutters lost. The crew did not have to meet the enemy face-to-face, nor did they experience any great risk of capture, as did other, less chronicled cutters.

There is another possible captured cutter that remains a mystery. The revenue cutter *Polly* or *Poly* is mentioned only by H. D. Smith. She was in service in 1809, but to date no information as to its home port, officers, or crew has surfaced. Why place her with the list of captured revenue cutters? The answer is simple: British prisoner-of-war records show a revenue cutter *Polly* captured between 18 and 27 July 1813 near Newfoundland at position 46N 56W. The dates are not clear, nor are the capturing vessels. The records show the HMS *Maidstone*, *Ringdove*, *Plover*, and *Prize* [*Surprise*] as capturing the cutter on different days. In addition, the prisoner-of-war records for Halifax indicate that at least three seamen

shown on the cutter's crew were captured by the HMS *Statura* and *Martin*, whereas another crewman is shown as being captured on 10 July 1813 by HM Schooner *Picton*. The discrepancy in dates could be from the date of transfer, the vessel transferred upon of prisoners and simple clerical error.

British records indicate a schooner *Polly* was recaptured on 13 August. This may account for the names of two men being shown on several prisoner lists. Seaman Chris Babbridge captured by both *Plover* and *Statura* and Seaman William Dorrison, captured by both *Maidstone* and *Statura*. An explanation for the dual captures may be that *Polly* escaped and was recaptured, or these men were part of a prize crew. The number of men, eighteen, without an accompanying officer appears large for a prize crew. Then again, it was common to transfer prisoners and list each receiving vessel.

The mystery is compounded by the loss of the logs for the British vessels for this period. What is known is that there was an England-bound convoy within the same area of the *Polly* capture which was guarded by the same vessels. All told, eighteen men from the *Polly* were interred, including three sixteen-year-old boys. This capture will surely need more research and offers an intriguing mystery. It also makes all aware that the historical record is incomplete.

So what is learned from the capture of relatively unknown revenue cutters? In July 1812, Captain Broke on board HMS *Shannon* wrote Sir John Wilson Croker, "our Squadron is in excellent service order and confident of destroying our Enemy's little Navy if we are fortunate enough to meet them."⁴⁰ This overconfidence cost lives. The same form of overconfidence skews the events and perceptions of Revenue Cutter Service's participation in the war. Many former researchers assumed the truth and validity of the events and allowed some academic overconfidence that there was no more to learn cloud and hamper further research. In fairness, every capture of a revenue cutter became a publicity victim to some major Naval battle whether victory or defeat. These

Naval battles involving USS *Wasp*, *Constitution*, and *Hornet*, as well as numerous famous privateers, overshadowed the seemingly insignificant losses of revenue cutters.

Unfortunately, all accounts of losses ignored the basic premise of historical inquiry to explain what happened and why. The personalities of the cutters' officers made the situations what they were, and a more complete portrayal of the events and men involved will serve as models for future officers. The RCS and Coast Guard were, and are, services made of the actions and adventures (or misadventures) of their officer corps. The vessels were only stages for these characters and personalities. Ironi-

cally, future generations should be grateful that these cutters were captured. Their captures provide us with a larger historical record than had they not been captured.

The revenue cutters in the War of 1812 were minor vessels. Their use, or misuse, made little difference to the war's outcome. Although previous historical works about them followed the heroic model, their obvious incomplete research raises curiosity and interest for further study. Despite renewed interest, the decks of the Revenue Cutter Service historical interpretation remain cluttered and smoke filled.



NOTES

1. Horatio Davis Smith, "The United States Revenue Marine," *The United Service Magazine* (new series), 3 (August, 1880), 234–243.
2. Horatio Davis Smith, *Early History of the United States Revenue Marine Service* or (United States Revenue Cutter Service 1789–1849, Elliot Snow, ed., Naval Historical Foundation, 1932. (Reprint, US Coast Guard Historians Office: Washington, DC, 1989).
3. *The New-Brunswick Courier*, Saint John, New Brunswick, 23 July 1812, 2, col. 3.
4. *Courier* "Ship News," 24 August 1812, 2, col. 4. [From Boston, 9 August] This article gives credit of capture to HMS *Plumper*. The present location of Haycock's Harbor is different from 1812; it is now on the coast of Maine, south of Jim's Head.
5. *Advocate*, August 20, 1812, 3, col. 1.
6. Except for Elliot, the *Commodore Barry's* officers are unknown. Elliot was commissioned on 13 April 1812. A review of the officer lists show two other April appointments from Massachusetts: First Lieutenant Charles S. Woodward, 13 April, and Second Lieutenant James S. Carmon, 10 April.
7. National Archives, RG 26, Coast Guard, "Extraordinary Events of the Revenue Marine."
8. Public Records Office Kew, Richmond, Surrey, England. Hereafter PRO Kew. ADM 1/502 Promiscuous Letters, North America 1812.
9. PRO Kew: ADM 103/167, Halifax 1812–1814 and ADM 103/171 Halifax Exchanges 1812–1815.
10. PRO Kew, ADM 51/2812, *Spartan*, Captain's Logs, 3 August 1812.
11. NA RG 36 E-474. Collector of Customs L. Trescott, Passamaquoddy to Henry Dearborn, Boston, 10 March 1812. *Commodore Barry* was purchased at New York for \$4,100.
12. Augusta [GA] *Chronicle* 26, 13 July 1812.
13. *Republican and Savannah Evening Ledger* (Savannah, GA) No. 89, 25 July, 1812, 3, col. 1. Also reported in *Niles Weekly Register*, Vol. II, 381.
14. National Archives, RG 36, Collectors of Customs, Entry 1477, Savannah, GA, Letter from George Brooks, 24 July 1812.
15. *Niles Register*, II (ca. July 1812): 381, 398. (From *Republican and Savannah Evening Ledger*); *Republican and Savannah Evening Ledger*, July 25, 1812, 3 col. 1. Reports capture of a "snow" on Friday, 24 July 1812; *Augusta Herald* (Georgia), 30 July 1812. Reprint of article from *Savannah Museum* of "Friday last" giving *Shamrock's* capture; NA RG 36 E-1477. Savannah. George Brooks to Archibald Bulloch 24 July 1812. Notes *Shamrock* was in ballast from London.
16. NA, RG 36, Entry 1477, Savannah, GA. Brooks to Archibald Bulloch, 13 July 1812.
17. *The Times* (Charleston, S.C.) 24:3765, 13 July 1812, 3, col. 2. (Microfilm Roll 25).
18. King, *The Coast Guard Under Sail*, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989), 57, lists the capture date as 12 August.
19. PRO Kew: ADM 1/1946, Captain's Letters, 'H' 1812, No. 353. The same account was also printed in the *London Gazette*, No 16660, Tuesday 20 October to Saturday 24 October 1812, 2118, col. 2.

20. Prize Case. HCA32/1289 case 1253, 6 February 1813.
21. PRO Kew: ADM 103/26, POW Registers, Bermuda. The Coast Guard's *Record of Movement* incorrectly lists the date of capture as the 24 November 1812.
22. Northern Ireland PRO, Bill of Sale A3842-2-0, 16 June 1813.
23. PRO Kew, ADM 103/26, POW Registers. Bermuda 130, 6. The *James Madison's* officers arrived at Bermuda on 14 September. The record indicates they were to be paroled to New London on 24 October. However, they traveled to New York on board the Brig *Diamond* with the officers of the USS *Wasp*, including Captain Jacob Jones, First Lieutenant W. Rodgers, Second Lieutenant James Biddle, and another 170 prisoners. No explanation has been uncovered to clear the discrepancy in the dates.
24. PRO Kew: ADM 103/167, POW Registers Halifax 1812–1814.
25. PRO Kew: ADM 103/56, POW Registers. Chatham 1812–1815, 72.
26. Letter from John H. Robertson to Coast Guard Historian, 5 June 1991. Mr. Robertson gave permission to use his material that accompanied the letter on 27 March 1994. (Copy in author's collection).
27. H. D. Smith, "Capture of the United States Revenue Cutter 'Surveyor': An Historical Incident of the War of 1812," *United Service Magazine*, 7 (April 1892), 363–371.
28. *Niles Weekly Register* 4, 25 June 1813, 278–288.
29. Correspondence between the Secretary of the Treasury and Collectors of Customs, 1789–1833. Microfilm M178. Roll 3.
30. H. W. Flourney, ed., *Calendar of Virginia State Papers and Other Manuscripts*, 1 January 1808–31 December 1835. (Richmond, Va., 1892, Reprint: Kraus Corporation, New York, 1968), Vol. 10, 224–225. Richard E. Parker to James Barbour (governor), Richmond, 11 April 1813.
31. King, *Under Sail*, 57; Kensil Bell, *Always Ready*, (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1947), 47; Stephen H. Evans, *The United States Coast Guard, 1790–1915*. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1968), 21; Chapelle, *American Sailing Ships*, 188.
32. Smith, *Early History*, 26–27. Also reported in *Charleston Courier*, 24 and 26 June 26, 1813, (from *Richmond Enquirer* 13 June 1813 and *Norfolk (VA) Herald*, 18 June 1813 respectively).
33. Tilley, John A., "The Loss of the Revenue Cutter *Surveyor*, 1813," US Coast Guard Historical Painting Project, Greenville, NC, (n.p. undated), 1.
34. PRO Kew: ADM 1/503. Lieutenant Cririe's name has been misspelled by Smith, *Early History*, 27; and dutifully following were Evans, *USCG*, 21; Chapelle, *American Sailing Ships*, 189; King, *Under Sail*, 57, and I. However, the error comes from a misspelling in the *Norfolk Herald*, 18 June 1813.
35. NA, SOT, M178, Roll 2, 294. Campbell to McCulloch, 21 May 1814.
36. William A. Crozier, ed., *Virginia County Records*, Williamsburg Wills. (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing, 1973), 3. "Travis Family," *William & Mary Quarterly* 28 (July 1909), 143. Travis served from 1818 in the Virginia House of Delegates to his death in 1821.
37. *London Gazette*, Saturday, 17 December 1814, 2466, col. 2.
38. Smith, *Early Days*, 28; Evans, *USCG*, 19; Melvin H. Jackson, "The Defense of the Revenue Cutter *Eagle*," *U.S. Coast Guard Academy Alumni Association Bulletin*, (January-February 1964), 151; King *Under Sail*, 59; Chapelle, *American Sailing Ships*, 189. Jackson notes that Smith used a narrative from the *New Haven Connecticut Journal*, but Smith, *Early Days* (29), gives the source as the *New Haven Columbia Register*.
39. Jackson, "Defense of the Revenue Cutter *Eagle*," 154; Smith, *Early Days*, 28; King, *Under Sail*, 59; Bell, *Always Ready*, 48; Evans, *USCG*, 19; *ROM*, 116.
40. PRO Kew: ADM 1/1553, 357. 30 July 1812.

Saturday, 10 April 1999 — The National Archives — Mid-Atlantic Region will host a seminar on the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard which will look at the past, present, and future of this historic site. For more information please contact: Joseph-James Ahern, PNSY Seminar Chair, American Philosophical Society Library, 105 S. 5th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19106, or by e-mail: jjahern@amphilsoc.org